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3 October 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700290001-8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3 October 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK
Communist China - USSR: The Chinese Communists are continuing to make claims for their communes, which, despite expressed Soviet disagreement, they insist will help usher in the era of Communism at some time in the future. In a major article written for the October issue of the bloc's theoretical journal discussing Peiping's "10 years of successes," government Chairman Liu Shao-chi asserted that as far as "our" country is concerned, the commune--a new "road" which has been "discovered" by the Chinese--will be "a suitable form of social organization at the basic level after China has entered Communism." At least one Soviet theorist has recently contradicted similar Chinese claims with the flat statement that the commune is "impossible" in the future Communist society. The Chinese leaders may still hope to gain at least limited Soviet endorsement of the commune program while Khrushchev is in China. While it is unlikely that this ideological difference is drastically weakening the Sino-Soviet alliance, Peiping's determination to increase its prestige by introducing "new" theories and procedures will be a constant irritant in the relationship.

25X1

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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N Laos: [Although UN Secretary General Hammarskjold expects the UN subcommittee on Laos to arrive soon in New York to draft its report, he will probably advise the delegates' governments to leave some elements of the mission in Vientiane in order to assure a continuing UN presence. The subcommittee, now making a limited survey in northern Laos, is hampered in its work by the lack of helicopters. Some delegates are looking toward a departure date of 9 October, but others are willing to stay on to try to survey the forward areas.]

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OK Pakistan: [The retirement on 30 September of Lt. General Habibullah, Pakistani army chief of staff, confirms earlier evidence of a serious rift in Pakistan's top army leadership. During the past year, friction has existed between Habibullah and General Musa, commander in chief. The reasons for Habibullah's retirement have not yet been officially stated. Habibullah's apparently forced retirement could generate significant discord within the officer corps of the Pakistani Army and lower the military government's prestige.]

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
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DAILY BRIEF

ii

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700290001-8

25X1



III. THE WEST

DK Turkey: Bitterness between the two major political parties in Turkey has intensified as the result of recent acts of violence against opposition deputies. In the most recent incident, several opposition deputies traveling in western Turkey were seriously injured in an ambush by a mob of local Democratic party adherents. The leader of the major opposition party fears the government may ban his party.

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DK Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios' decision to meet next week with former EOKA leader Grivas in an attempt to remove differences between them is welcomed by the great majority of Greek Cypriot nationalists, who fear that the dispute will benefit the Communists. Makarios stands to lose if agreement is not reached, while Grivas' prestige will probably be enhanced regardless of the outcome. On Cyprus, a wave of lawlessness in recent weeks has caused heightened tension between the Greek and Turkish communities. Meanwhile, Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot negotiators have made some progress toward agreement on executive powers in the future government of Cyprus. The first Cypriot elections may take place in December.

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Guatemala: [Ambassador Mallory is seriously concerned over Guatemala's future political orientation, particularly as it may affect US interests. Some anti-US and pro-Communist political factions are being fostered by the beleaguered President Ydigoras in an effort to weaken the strong, leftist but anti-Communist Revolutionary party. These factions are vying for the backing of leftist ex-President Arevalo, who still retains considerable popularity in Guatemala, and one group is believed to be receiving Cuban financial aid.] [REDACTED]

(Page 5)

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Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700290001-8

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004700290001-8

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Retirement of Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Indicates ...

Army Factionalism

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The retirement of Lt. Gen. Habibullah on 30 September confirms earlier evidence of a serious rift in Pakistan's top army leadership. Although the specific reasons for Habibullah's retirement have not been stated, a number of reports indicate it was forced by General Musa, commander-in-chief. During the past year, friction has existed between Habibullah and Musa, and Musa may have been responsible for the recent retirement of one brigadier who supported Habibullah and the transfer of another.]

The military government under President Ayub, which has been in control since 1958, may lose prestige when Habibullah's retirement becomes public knowledge and generates rumors of infighting within top army echelons. Habibullah was apparently considered more capable than Musa, and he seems to have been well liked by his fellow officers. The army officer corps may face a serious morale problem which will require President Ayub's attention.]

The shift of the national capital from Karachi to the Rawalpindi area, where army general headquarters is located, is scheduled to begin this month, and this will facilitate closer contacts between Ayub and army leaders.]

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III. THE WEST

Political Bitterness Increasing in Turkey

Political tension is rising in Turkey in anticipation of the reconvening of the Grand National Assembly on 1 November. Twice, groups of opposition deputies have been attacked by large crowds of local members of the ruling party. During the most recent of these attacks, on 22 September, several deputies were reported to be seriously injured.

The minister of the interior immediately sent the chief of the Turkish National Police to investigate the incident. The Turkish Government has banned any press accounts of the affair and has publicly charged that the opposition Republican People's party (RPP) is trying to subvert the governing Democratic party.

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[President Izmet Inonu, leader of the RPP, reportedly fears that the government may decide to close down his party and has cautioned RPP campaign teams visiting the provinces not to engage in "aggressive" tactics. The recent forced resignation of RPP Secretary General Gulek, chief spokesman for an aggressive party policy, may have been intended as a conciliatory gesture to keep the government from banning the RPP prior to the reconvening of parliament.]

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The RPP, which has 170 of the 610 parliamentary seats, has maintained a running propaganda battle with the governing DP ever since the last general election in 1957. Last spring Inonu himself was the target of violence at the hands of a DP mob. At that time, special security precautions were taken by the government to prevent the situation from getting out of hand.

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Guatemalan President Supports Leftist Extremists in Effort
To Split Opposition

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[Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras, faced with strong opposition from the moderately leftist Revolutionary party (PR) and conspiracies by the rightist Nationalist Democratic Movement (MDN), is using leftist extremists in a desperate effort to retain power. He fostered the recent organization of three new leftist splinter parties from elements opposed to the moderate PR leadership, a number of them with records of Communist collaboration. Ydigoras apparently plans to subsidize one or more of these parties in the crucial December congressional elections in the hope that they will split the PR.]

[The leftist splinter parties are vying for the backing of bitterly anti-US former President Juan Jose Arevalo, whose administration from 1945 to 1951 paved the way for Communist domination of the succeeding Arbenz regime. Though Arevalo, now in Venezuela, has been in exile since 1954, he retains wide popularity in Guatemala. Arevalo's influence could weaken or destroy the current PR leadership, which is anti-Communist. The resulting leftist political force would be formidable if united under Arevalo's leadership and would probably be Communist infiltrated. American Ambassador Mallory is seriously concerned over the effect of these maneuvers on Guatemala's future political orientation, particularly as it affects US interests.]

[The Castro regime in Cuba may be backing the Arevalo forces. Last July, Fidel Castro through his brother Raul

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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